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 Is time ripe for price level path stability? 
 










Abstract: In the paper, we provide a critical and selective survey of arguments 
relevant for the assessment of the case for price level path stability (PLPS). Using a 
standard hybrid new Keynesian model we argue that price level stability provides a 
natural framework for monetary policy under commitment. There are two main 
arguments in favour of a PLPS regime. First, it helps overall macroeconomic stability 
by making expectations operate like automatic stabilizers. Second, under a price level 
path stability regime, changes in the price level operates like an intertemporal 
adjustment mechanism, reducing the magnitude of required changes in nominal 
interest rates. Such a property is particularly relevant as a means to alleviate the 
importance of the zero bound on nominal interest rates. We also review and discuss 
the arguments against price level path stability. Finally, we also found, using the 
Smets and Wouters (2003) model which includes a wide variety of frictions and is 
estimated for the euro area, that the price level is stationary under optimal policy 
under commitment. The results obtain when the quasi-difference of inflation is used 
in the loss function, as in the hybrid new Keynesian model. Overall, the arguments in 
favour of or against price level path stability depend on the degree of dependence of 
private sector expectations on the characteristics of the monetary policy regime.  
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Non-technical summary 
According to the conventional wisdom in central banking circles, price level path 
stability is not an appropriate goal to delegate to an independent central bank. There is 
strong intuition behind this claim. The idea is that, under a regime of price level path 
stability, a shock to the price level, causing temporary above-average inflation, must 
be followed by a correction implying below-average inflation, and vice-versa. The use 
of monetary policy to move around inflation, in order to stabilize the price level, 
implies an increase in the volatility of inflation. Moreover, in the presence of price 
and wage stickiness, moving around inflation requires pushing output above or below 
potential as the case may be. Hence, the intuition goes, price level path stability would 
induce increased volatility of inflation and output gaps, compared to a regime of 
inflation targeting. The common practice of letting bygones be bygones is, thus, 
justified. Past deviations from target are effectively ignored. If there is some impulse 
leading to a one-off jump to the price level there is no effort to reverse it. Instead, 
inflation targeting aims at bringing projected (and actual) inflation back to target. 
Under such a regime it should be true that over a sufficiently long period average 
inflation comes close to target inflation. Nevertheless, the uncertainty about the price 
level would rise without limit.   
In contrast, under a price level path target, the monetary authority would consistently 
aim at correcting deviations from target. In case the price level is above the price level 
norm, monetary policy aims at a lower average inflation rate for a period of time; in 
case it is below the norm, monetary policy aims at an above average inflation rate. 
Under such a regime both average inflation and the price level would be well 
anchored at low frequencies.  
In this paper, we critically and selectively review arguments that are relevant for 
assessing the case for price stability, i.e. the case for stability around a price level 
path. We identify two main arguments in favour of such a regime. First, under rational 
expectations price level stability helps overall macroeconomic stability by making 
expectations operate like automatic stabilizers. After a positive (negative) shock to the 
price level, firms, correctly anticipating a persistent policy response that will reverse 
the effect on the price level, adjust their inflation expectations down (up), thereby 
mitigating the impact of the shock. Moreover, focusing on the price level path 
contributes to circumventing credibility problems that central banks may face.   3
Second, a commitment to a reversion to a price level path helps to alleviate the zero 
bound on nominal interest rates. Here the reason is that the changes in the price level 
help the inter-temporal adjustment. The mechanism described above implies that after 
a negative shock to the price level inflation expectations adjust upward, thereby 
depressing real interest rates, which in turn contributes to the stabilisation of the 
economy. Overall, the conventional wisdom that relies on a trade-off between low 
frequency uncertainty of the price level and high frequency volatility of inflation and 
the output gap disregards the fundamental importance of endogenous expectations for 
monetary policy making. In the paper we present arguments that make the case for 
price level stability dependent on the endogenous character of expectations. Such 
arguments are of general interest as they highlight the importance of endogenous 
expectations for the conduct of monetary policy.  
We then turn to investigating two arguments that have been used against the case for 
price level targeting. First, the superior performance of price level stability crucially 
hinges on the (assumed) credibility of the reversion in the price level. It is argued that 
if expectations are mainly backward-looking, the additional benefits of price-level 
stability will be small. Moreover, the transitional costs of establishing the credibility 
of a regime of price level path stability may be too large. Relying on our own recent 
research in models with adaptive learning, we present examples that this is not 
generally the case. We show that, under adaptive learning on the part of firms, the 
track record obtained under such a regime leads to a similar case for price level path 
targeting. We also show that the question of regime transition and the associated costs 
is important but not decisive. A second argument is that price level stability would 
make past policy mistakes very costly to unwind. The literature suggests, however, 
that through the endogenous expectation formation process price level targeting may 
automatically correct past policy mistakes. 
 
We perform our analysis mostly within the framework of the hybrid New Keynesian 
Phillips curve, abstracting from other frictions such as nominal and real labour market 
rigidities. Such frictions will typically increase the costs associated with reverting the 
price level following a shock. However, they also increase the benefits of price level 
stability to the extent that the impact of inflation shocks on inflation is reduced. In 
particular, when agents and the central bank are learning and inflation shocks may   4
persist and become costly to control, the benefits of price level stability may outweigh 
the costs. Moreover, those costs can be reduced by lengthening the horizon for price 
level stability accordingly. Using a more elaborate estimated New Keynesian model, 
that incorporates a wide range of frictions, including nominal wage stickiness, habit 
formation and investment adjustment costs, we find that optimal policy under 
commitment continues to deliver a stationary price level, as it does in the simple new 
Keynesian model. The results obtain using an ad-hoc loss function in the semi-
difference of inflation, the output gap and interest rate changes 
    
Finally, it is frequently argued that a strategy based on price level stability would be 
hard to communicate and to explain to the public. In the paper we have argued that, 
on the contrary, a focus on the price level allows the central bank to follow a 
consistent communication strategy that circumvents the strains of commitment.  
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1.   Introduction 
According to the conventional wisdom in central banking circles, price level path 
stability is not an appropriate goal to delegate to an independent central bank. There is 
strong intuition behind this claim. The idea is that, under a regime of price level path 
stability, a shock to the price level, causing temporary above-average inflation, must 
be followed by a correction implying below-average inflation, and vice-versa. The use 
of monetary policy to move around inflation, in order to stabilize the price level, 
implies an increase in the volatility of inflation. Moreover, in the presence of price 
and wage stickiness, moving around inflation requires pushing output above or below 
potential as the case may be. Hence, the intuition goes, price level path stability would 
induce increased volatility of inflation and output gaps, compared to a regime of 
inflation targeting. The common practice of letting bygones be bygones is, thus, 
justified. This consensus was, for example, reflected in the paper that Stanley Fisher 
contributed to the conference celebrating the tercentenary of the Bank of England in 
1994, where he said: "Price level targeting is thus a bad idea, one that would add 
unnecessary short-term fluctuations to the economy." The trade-off between low 
frequency price (level) variability and higher frequency inflation and output (gap) 
volatility was also found in a number of small macroeconomic models, developed in 
the 1990s (for example Lebow, Roberts and Stockton (1992), Fillion and Tetlow 
(1994), Haldane and Salmon (1995) and Laxton, Ricketts and Rose (1994)). 
 
As noted above the main difference between inflation targeting and price level path 
targeting is the relevance each gives to past departures from target. Under inflation 
targeting bygones are bygones. Past deviations from target are effectively ignored. If 
there is some impulse leading to a one-off jump to the price level there is no effort to 
reverse it. Instead, inflation targeting aims at bringing projected (and actual) inflation 
back to target. Thus, under an inflation targeting regime it should be true that over a 
sufficiently long period average inflation comes close to target inflation. Such 
outcome requires symmetric random shocks and a monetary policy authority that 
consistently and symmetrically aims at the target. Nevertheless, the uncertainty about 
the price level would rise without limit. This is also illustrated by the recent 
experience of central banks like the Sveriges Riksbank, the Bank of Canada and the   6
European Central Bank, which each have defined price stability with reference to an 
annual increase of consumer prices by two percent. Figure 1 plots the development of 
the consumer price level in each of those three economies since 1999 (when the ECB 
was established). The average inflation rate over the period from 1999 till 2006 is 
indeed very close to two percent in each of those economies. However, the 
uncertainty about the price level over a period of eight years is much higher, as 
highlighted by the range of price levels at the end of 2006.    
 
Figure 1 

















In contrast, under a price level path target, the monetary authority would consistently 
aim at correcting deviations from target.
2 In case the price level is above the price 
level norm, monetary policy aims at a lower average inflation rate for a period of 
time; in case it is below the norm, monetary policy aims at an above average inflation 
rate.
34 Under such a regime both average inflation and the price level would be well 
                                                 
2   The price level target can be defined as a deterministically increasing price path. A case for literal price level 
stability may be based on the analogy with the system of weights and measures. It relates to the use of money 
as a unit of account. A very powerful formulation is due to Francois Leblanc (1690): "if there is something in 
the world that ought to be stable it is money, the measure of everything that enters the channels of trade. What 
confusion would not be in a state where weights and measures frequently changed? On what basis and with 
what assurance would a person deal with another, and which nations would come to deal with people who 
lived in such disorder?"  
3   Average here refers to the average inflation rate implicit in the definition of the normative price level path.   7
anchored at low frequencies. Low uncertainty over long horizons may be crucial for 
the long-term financial planning of home purchase or retirement. Such a line of 
enquiry would lead to a number of questions like:  how important are the benefits 
from low long-term price level uncertainty? Would price level stability make a 
difference for the use of long-term debt contracts or the duration of investment 
projects?
5 These are interesting and important questions. They are also beyond the 
scope of this paper.
6 
 
Instead the path that we want to pursue in this paper stems from Svensson (1999), 
Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). Svensson 
(1999) was the first to emphasize that, under rational expectations, price level 
targeting might lead to lower inflation and to identical output variability. Price level 
targeting would, thus, deliver a free lunch. The intuition is that, within a model that 
incorporated a Lucas-supply function, delegating a price level target to a central bank 
helps solving the time inconsistency problem. The argument put forward by Svensson 
(1999) is very strong and, hence, persuasive. It implies that, even if society does not 
care about price stability per se, it may still be well advised to focus on price level 
stability. Moreover, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Svensson and Woodford 
(2005) have shown that in a simple New-Keynesian model, optimal monetary policy 
under commitment leads to a stationary price level.
7 The intuition is clear. When the 
central bank is committed to stabilize the price level, rational expectations become 
automatic stabilizers. The mechanism operates as follows. Assume that a deflationary 
or disinflationary disturbance leads to a fall in the price level relative to target. 
Economic agents observing the shock understand that the central bank will correct the 
                                                                                                                                            
4   In a recent report on the Riksbank’s monetary policy, Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006) suggest that following the 
persistent undershooting of the inflation target in Sweden, monetary policy should lean towards more 
expansionary policy. In his reply, Governor Ingves (2006) replied that a time-varying inflation target would be 
too difficult to communicate and that it would complicate inflation expectation formation and may make it 
more difficult to anchor expectations. A price level target would be a natural way of implementing such a 
policy. 
5   Similar questions are raised in Bank of Canada (2006). 
6   In 3 July 1933, US President Roosevelt stated his commitment to long run price stability in no uncertain terms: 
"The United States seeks the kind of dollar which a generation hence will have the same purchasing power and 
debt paying power as the dollar we hope to attain in the near future." The address was a wireless 
communication to the World Economic Conference that had started on June 12, in London (available from 
http://www.presidency.ucsd.edu/?pid=14679). It is clear from other documents that Roosevelt aimed at 
inflating the economy after a period of deflation. Such a goal is much easier to attain in case mean reversion is 
a permanent feature of the policy regime. See McCallum (2005). 
7   See the monumental Woodford (2003) for a complete presentation.   8
disturbance through higher inflation than otherwise in the near future. As a result, 
inflation expectations increase, which helps to mitigate the initial impact of the 
deflationary shock, spreads it over time and contributes to overall stability. Under a 
credible regime implying reversion in the price level, inflation expectations operate as 
automatic stabilizers. The beneficial impact of a credible price level target on current 
inflation and inflation expectations was typically lacking in the analysis with 
backward-looking models reported above.    
 
The new Keynesian model is currently the main workhorse for monetary policy 
analysis. Its relevant friction, leading to monetary non-neutrality, is sticky prices 
and/or wages. The main alternative, in the literature, is sticky information. Ball, 
Mankiw and Reis (2005) explore a model that belongs to this class with foundations 
rooted in behavioural economics. Interestingly they find that optimal monetary policy 
stabilizes the price level path in response to demand and productivity shocks. In 
general terms, optimal monetary policy, in their model, may be characterized as 
flexible targeting of the price level. 
 
Our objective in this paper is modest. In the next section, we review the case in favour 
of price level stability, using a standard hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve, which 
following the seminal book by Woodford (2003) has become the workhorse in most 
monetary policy analysis. We follow Svensson (1999) and assume that society does 
not care about price stability per se. In this set-up, we first explain in Section 2.1 how 
the optimal monetary policy under commitment is characterised by mean reversion in 
the price level and how assigning a price level stability objective can implement the 
first-best monetary policy as in Vestin (2006) and Röisland (2005). In Section 2.2, we 
then turn to the argument that anchoring inflation expectations by means of price level 
targets could also help to address the problem posed by the zero lower bound on 
interest rates.
8 This follows the early intuition of Duguay (1994) and Coulombe 
(1997) that announcing a target path for the price level would help promote 
expectations of a future rebound in inflation even in the event that the economy 
                                                 
8   In the context of the renewal of its Inflation Control Target on 23 November 2006, the Bank of Canada (2006) 
mentions this argument as one of the main reasons for studying the relative merits of specifying a price-level 
target as opposed to an inflation target.    9
should fall into a lower bound situation, which would in turn help resist deflation and 
a profound downturn in the first place. Wolman (2005) and Eggertson and Woodford 
(2005) make this case in the context of a version of the New Keynesian model 
discussed in Section 2.1.
9 Finally, in Section 2.3 we use the Smets and Wouters 
(2003) model to show that the price level remains stationary under optimal policy 
under commitment, even in a model which includes a wide variety of frictions and is 
estimated for the euro area. The result obtains when the quasi-difference of inflation is 
used in the loss function, as in the hybrid New Keynesian model. .    
 
In section 3 we then turn to investigating two arguments that have been used against 
the case for price level targeting. First, the superior performance of price level 
stability crucially hinges on the (assumed) credibility of the reversion in the price 
level. It is argued that if expectations are mainly backward-looking, the additional 
benefits of price-level stability will be small.
10 Moreover, the transitional costs of 
establishing the credibility of a regime of price level path stability may be too large. 
Following our own on-going research (Gaspar, Smets and Vestin, 2007), we address 
these issues in Section 3.1, by extending the basic New Keynesian framework with 
adaptive learning. A second argument is that the benefits of price level targeting 
depend too much on unrealistic assumptions regarding central bankers' ability to 
control the price level. The idea here is that, because of uncertainty about the state and 
the functioning of the economy, policy makers make mistakes and generate volatility 
in the price level. Under price level targeting they will be forced to create additional 
volatility in the real economy in order to undo the effects of their own mistakes on the 
price level. In Section 3.2, we rely on recent results by Aoki and Nikolov (2006) to 
address this issue. Finally, Section 4 contains our main conclusions.  
 
                                                 
9   A related argument that we do not discuss is that price level stability reduces the risk of a debt deflation spiral. 
While deeper and more efficient financial markets allow households and firms to better smooth their 
expenditure patterns and hedge against the various risks they are subjected to, they also lead to higher 
indebtedness of certain agents, making them more sensitive to unexpected changes in both asset and goods 
prices. If such unexpected asset price collapses lead to deflationary expectations and falling prices, the real 
debt burden will typically further rise and a Fisherian debt-deflation spiral could start. A focus on price level 
stability ensures that the real redistribution due to nominal shocks will be (perceived as) temporary and may 
thereby reduce the probability of a debt deflation spiral. Of course, the importance of this argument will also 
depend on the source of the shocks.   
10   See, for example, Barnett and Engineer (2000).   10
Before turning to the analysis of Sections 2 and 3, it is worth recalling that the current 
focus in central banking on stabilising inflation rather than the price level is a 
relatively new phenomenon that arose in the wake of the Great Inflation of the 1970s. 
One could argue that price level stability is the natural fiduciary alternative to the 
commodity standards of the pre-World War II economies.
11 Research on the Gold 
Standard shows that in this period the price level was indeed mean reverting and that 
periods of falling prices were not necessarily associated with lower output growth or 
higher output losses. Indeed, various papers by Bordo and Redish (2003, 2004) have 
demonstrated that deflations in the pre-1914 classical gold standard period in the 
United Kingdom and Germany were primarily driven by productivity-driven increases 
in aggregate supply. For the United States, these results generally prevail with the 
exception of a banking-panic-induced demand-driven deflation episode in the mid-
1890s. Bordo and Filardo (2004) generalize this finding to a panel of over twenty 
countries for the past two centuries. With the exception of the interwar period they 
find that deflation was generally benign. Interestingly, Berg and Jonung (1999) argue 
that the adoption of a price level target in Sweden during the Great Depression has 
alleviated the output losses associated with deflation in this country.  
 
2.   The case for price-level stability 
2.1.   The optimality of price level stability in the New Keynesian model  
A case for the optimality of price level stability can be based on the benchmark New 
Keynesian model, as, for example, in Woodford (2003). This model rests on a number 
of assumptions. First, the production sector of the economy is composed by a large 
number of identical monopolistically competitive firms. Monopolistic competition 
prevails because firms produce differentiated goods that are imperfect substitutes. 
Second, the monopolistically competitive firms are price setters. They set prices 
before knowing demand and are committed to satisfy demand at the set price. As in 
Calvo (1983), a proportion of firms are allowed to re-set their prices at the end of each 
period. This proportion is exogenously given and constant over time. Third, firms that 
are not allowed to re-set prices adjust their prices to offset a fraction of the average 
price change observed in the period. Such partial indexation to past inflation is 
                                                 
11   The monetary literature of the early days of the 20
th century (Fisher, Keynes and Wicksell) shows as much.   11
justified by the need to match the degree of inflation persistence found in aggregate 
data, but is not in line with micro-evidence. Fourth, firms produce using labour only 
and technology exhibits diminishing returns. Fifth, all goods contribute in a 
symmetric way to the utility of the representative consumer.  
The model delivers a strong case for price stability (Goodfriend and King, 1997, 2001 
and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). Given the symmetry of preferences and 
technology, an efficient equilibrium is characterized by equal production of all goods 
and unitary relative prices. Due to staggered price setting, inflation creates 
inefficiencies as relative prices and associated quantities will differ across producers. 
Price stability restores the efficient equilibrium. 
In this section, we lay out the basic model and show that optimal monetary policy is 
characterized by mean reversion in the price level. In other words, price level stability 
is implied by optimal policy.
12 As extensively discussed in Woodford (2003), under 
rational expectations, the set of micro-economic assumptions considered above gives 
rise to the following standard New Keynesian model of inflation dynamics:  
(1)  () t t t t t t t u x + + − Ε = − + − κ γπ π β γπ π 1 1 , 
where  t π  is inflation,  t x  is the output gap and 
t u  is a cost-push shock (assumed 
i.i.d.). Furthermore, β is the discount rate, κ is a function of the underlying structural 
parameters including the degree of Calvo price stickiness, α , and γ  captures the 
degree of intrinsic inflation persistence due to partial indexation in the goods market. 
Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) have shown that 
such a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve fits the actual inflation process in the 
United States and the euro area quite well.  
In addition, we assume that the central bank uses the following loss function to guide 
its policy decisions:    
(2) 
2 2
1) ( t t t t x L λ γπ π + − = −  . 
                                                 
12   The benefits from price level targeting in a rational expectations framework were first highlighted by Svensson 
(1999) in the context of a neo-classical framework. Ditmar and Gavin (2000) show that a free lunch also arises 
when the aggregate supply function has the New Keynesian form with current expectations of future inflation 
rates.    12
Woodford (2003) has shown that, under rational expectations and the assumed 
microeconomic assumptions, such a loss function can be derived as a quadratic 
approximation of the (negative of the) period social welfare function, where λ=κ/θ 
measures the relative weight on output gap stabilization and θ is the elasticity of 
substitution between the differentiated goods. We implicitly assume that the inflation 
target is zero. To keep the model simple, we also abstract from any explicit 
representation of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and simply assume 
that the central bank controls the output gap directly.  
Next, we solve for optimal policy under rational expectations with and without 
commitment by the central bank.  
Defining zt =πt-γπt-1, equations (1) and (2) can be rewritten as: 
(1’)  t t t t t u x z E z + + = + κ β 1  
(2’)  .
2 2
t t t x z L λ + =  
Optimal monetary policy under discretion.  
If the central bank can not commit to its future policy actions, it will not be able to 
influence expectations of future inflation. In this case, there are no endogenous state 
variables and since the shocks are iid, the rational expectations solution (which 
coincides with the standard forward-looking model) must have the property Εtzt+1 = 0. 
Thus: 
(1’’)      t t t u x z + = κ  
Hence, the problem reduces to a static optimization problem. Substituting (1’’) into 
(2’) and minimizing the result with respect to the output gap, implies the following 
policy rule:  




= .                                                                                              
Under the optimal discretionary policy, the output gap only responds to the current 
cost-push shock. In particular, following a positive cost-push shock to inflation, 
monetary policy is tightened and the output gap falls. The strength of the response   13
depends on the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, κ, and the weight on 
output gap stabilization in the loss function, λ.
13  
Using (3) to substitute for the output gap in (1’’) and the definition of zt implies:  





+ = .                                                                                                              
Note that in this case inflation follows an AR(1) process and there is a unit root in the 
price level: 
(5)   t t t t u p p p ν γ γ + − + = − − 2 1 ) 1 (    
where  ) (
2 λ κ λ ν + = . Under discretionary monetary policy the price level does 
not revert to a constant mean.  
 
Optimal monetary policy under commitment 
Under discretion there is no inertia in policy behaviour. In contrast, if the central bank 
is able to credibly commit to future policy actions, optimal policy will feature a 
persistent “history dependent” response. In particular, Woodford (2003) shows that 
optimal policy will now be characterized by the following equation: 




In this case, the expressions for the output gap and inflation can be written as: 
(7)  t t t u x x
λ
κ
δ − = −1 , and 





+ = − − 1 1
) 1 (
, 
where  ( ) β β τ τ δ 2 / 4
2 − − =  and  λ β τ / 1
2 k + + = . Comparing equation (3) 
and (7), it is clear that under commitment optimal monetary policy is characterized by 
history dependence in spite of the fact that the shock is temporary. The intuitive 
                                                 
13  The reaction function in (3) contrasts with the one derived in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). They assume that 
the loss function is quadratic in inflation (instead of the quasi-difference of inflation, zt) and the output gap. 
They find that, in this case, lagged inflation appears in the expression for the reaction function, corresponding 
to optimal policy under discretion.   14
reason for this is that under commitment perceptions of future policy actions help 
stabilize current inflation, through their effect on expectations. By ensuring that, 
under rational expectations, a positive cost-push shock is associated with a decline in 
inflation expectations, optimal policy manages to spread the impact of the shock over 
time.  
One can show that in this case, the optimal reaction function can also be written as a 
function of past price levels and the cost-push shock:  
(9)  ) )( ( 2 1 t t t t u p p x + − − = − − γ λ κδ   
In words, the central bank tightens policy in response to a positive cost-push shock 
and in response to positive deviations of past prices from its target. Moreover, the 
optimal policy under commitment implies a stationary price level, as long as the 
degree of indexation is not perfect (i.e. γ  is less than one). In this case, the solution 
for the price level can be written as:  







1) (  ,  
where the expression for δ   is given above.  
 
Table 1  
Calibration parameters for the benchmark case
14 
 
β   γ   λ   θ  α  φ   κ   σ 
0.99 0.5 0.002 10  0.66 0.02 0.019 0.004 
 
Figure 2 below plots the response of the price level to a standard-deviation cost-push 
shock for different degrees of indexation. The calibration of the other parameters is 
taken from Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006) as in Table 1. As also shown by 
Woodford (2003, p500), the price level may exhibit a hump-shaped response, 
depending on the degree of indexation. The higher the degree of indexation, the more 
hump-shaped the response of the price level to a cost-push shock. However, 
                                                 
14 We justify our choices in Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006).   15




Responses to a cost-push shock under different degrees of indexation 

























Note: Low, medium and high refers to the degree of indexation of prices to lagged 
inflation of 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 respectively. 
 
This feature of optimal policy may seem counterintuitive. It is often argued that if one 
wishes to stabilise inflation and does not care about the absolute level of prices, then 
surprise deviations from the long-run average of inflation rate should not have any 
effect on the inflation rate that policy aims for subsequently: one should let bygones 
be bygones, even though this means allowing the price level to drift to a permanently 
different level. “Undoing” past deviations simply creates additional, unnecessary 
variability in inflation. This would be correct if the commitment to correct past 
deviations had no effect on expectations. However, if price setters are forward looking 
as in this New Keynesian model, the anticipation that a current increase in the general 
price level will predictably be undone, gives firms a reason to moderate the current 
adjustment of its own price. As a result, it is optimal to return the price level to its 
baseline in order to reduce equilibrium inflation variability.   16
  
Delegating a price level target to a discretionary central bank  
In the previous section, we have shown that price level stability is a feature of optimal 
policy under commitment in the basic hybrid New Keynesian model, even if there is 
some degree of indexation and there is lagged inflation dependence. However, in 
practice, there are incentives to depart from such a path. The temptation is apparent 
from Figure 2. For all cases plotted, there are periods when inflation is below target 
and, at the same time, output is below potential. In such periods the policy path under 
commitment looks inappropriate. It is possible to get simultaneously inflation closer 
to target and output closer to potential. Hence, according to common sense, policy 
should depart from its path under commitment. In such circumstances policy-makers 
face the strains of commitment. In other words, it is not easy for the central bank to 
commit to optimal policy. There is an incentive to re-optimize as time passes by and 
let bygones be bygones. In such a discretionary environment, assigning an explicit 
price level target to the central bank may be a transparent way to enforce the 
appropriate history dependence of monetary policy. Moreover, as pointed out by 
Svensson (1999), a price level target would also eliminate any existing inflation bias 
under discretionary policy.  
Indeed, Vestin (2006) shows that, when the central bank is operating in a 
discretionary environment, price level targeting outperforms inflation targeting in the 
basic forward-looking New Keynesian model with zero indexation. He shows that 
when there is no persistence in the cost-push shocks, the commitment equilibrium can 
be fully replicated. Röisland (2007) extends the results of Vestin (2006) to the hybrid 
case with indexation to past inflation as discussed above, and shows that also in this 
case it is beneficiary to assign a hybrid price level target to the central bank. In this 
case, the targeting rule can be written as a modified instantaneous loss function of the 
form 
2 2
1) ( t t t x p p λ γ + − − , where γ  is the degree of indexation as before and λ  is 
a modified weight on the output gap
15. Finally, Svensson and Woodford (2005) 
analyse optimal targeting rules in a related model and show that such a rule includes a 
term in the price level in addition to the more traditional terms in inflation and output 
gap volatility. The weight on the price level term in the optimal targeting rule is in 
general time-varying and depends on the shadow price of sticking to past promises. 
This time-varying weight underlines the notion that in general the horizon over which 
                                                 
15Röisland (2006) also shows the optimality of inflation targeting when there is full 
indexation (γ=1).    17
the central bank attempts to revert the price level will depend on the state of the 
economy and the shocks that have hit the economy in the past.  
 
Intuitively, these results highlight that price level targeting introduces history 
dependence and a stationary price level, both of which are characteristics of the 
commitment solution as mentioned above. 
 
It is worthwhile to pause to examine how focusing on the price level helps 
overcoming the strains of commitment. The argument becomes intuitive after careful 
examination of Figure 2. Looking simultaneously at the first and third panels it is 
apparent that optimal policy under commitment involves keeping output below 
potential as long as the price level is above target. Hence, communication of the 
rationale for optimal policy under commitment becomes easier as soon as one shifts 
the focus from inflation to the price level. Clearly, as Figure 2 makes clear, the time 
horizon associated with the return of the price level to target may be very long, in 
particular in the case of a relatively high partial indexation parameter, γ.  
 
It could be argued that it is difficult to reconcile such a long time horizon with a 
reasonable confidence that the favorable effects on private expectations will 
materialize. Given such a long time horizon it would be difficult for the private sector 
to figure out whether policymakers' behavior was consistent with their commitments. 
On this important consideration three remarks are in order. First, clearly the result 
presented is fully consistent with rational expectations. However, it is still possible to 
argue that the information and knowledge assumptions underlying rational 
expectations are particularly demanding under a price level stability regime. Hence, it 
is important to add a second remark. Figure 2 illustrates how a price level regime 
provides an information rich environment. The idea is that after a cost-push shock a 
relatively short period of inflation above target, depending on the degree of partial 
indexation, should be expected. After that, inflation should remain persistently below 
target in order to ensure correction in the price level. It is precisely because it takes so 
long to correct the price level that it is possible to monitor the process of adjustment 
well before the eventual correction materializes. 
 In any case, the reliance of the case for price level stability on credibility must be 
taken seriously. Below, in section 3.1., we find that the case for a price stability 
regime remains intact when the private sector departs from rational expectations and 
relies instead on adaptive learning. Finally, it is intuitively likely that a price level   18
stability regime would reduce the degree of indexation, which by itself would shorten 
the time horizon associated with corrections in the price level.      
 
2.2.   Price level stability, the zero lower bound and deflationary spirals 
An important additional argument in favour of a commitment to price level stability is 
related to its benefits in alleviating the potentially negative implications for macro-
economic stability of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. The argument is 
very intuitive. As highlighted by Duguay (1994) and Coulombe (1999), under price 
level targeting the price level plays the role of an intertemporal price reducing the 
need for variations in the nominal interest rate.
16  
To see this, it is instructive to write down the standard forward-looking IS-curve that 
results from intertemporal consumption smoothing. This IS curve links the output gap 
to the ex-ante real interest rate: 
(11)  t t T t
T
i







where  t x  is the output gap as before,  t R  is the nominal short-term interest rate and 
t ε  is a demand shock.
17 Assume now there is a negative demand shock that reduces 
current output and the current price level. Under credible price level targeting this will 
generate an expected increase in the price level ( t T p p > ), as the price level is 
expected to return to its target. As a result, for a given nominal interest rate, the real 
interest rate will fall stimulating current output. This will have an automatic 
stabilising effect on the economy. The net outcome of this stabilising effect is that 
nominal interest rates need to adjust less and as a result the frequency of hitting the 
zero lower bound for a given target rate of inflation will be less. Moreover, when 
nominal interest rates are stuck at zero, the price level will continue to operate as an 
automatically stabilising intertemporal price.   
Eggertson and Woodford (2005) formally analyse the benefits of price level targeting 
in a forward-looking New Keynesian model like the one we analysed in Section 2.1. 
When the degree of indexation is zero, the optimal targeting rule (7) can be written in 
terms of the price level: 
(12)  ) (




                                                 
16   Coulombe (1999) gives the concrete example of his grandfather, who would decide to buy durable goods 
based on whether the price level was relatively low.  
17   See Svensson (2006) for a similar analysis in the context of Japan’s liquidity trap.    19
Eggertson and Woodford (2005) show that this simple price level targeting rule does 
almost as well as the optimal non-linear rule under a zero lower interest rate 
constraint. Under the optimal non-linear rule, the price level target (
* p ) is time-
varying and depends on the length of time during which the lower zero constraint is 
binding. Eggertson and Woodford (2005) show that under their calibration the price 
level rule (12) creates losses that are only 9 percent of the losses that would ensue 
under a zero inflation target and only one fifth of the losses that would ensue under a 
two percent inflation target.
18 Equally importantly, the alternative policy rule (7), 
which without zero lower bound would also implement the commitment equilibrium, 
does much worse than the price level targeting rule. In fact, this rule does even worse 
than the zero inflation target rule. The reason for this is that this rule mandates 
deflation when there is growth in the output gap. This in turn implies that the central 
bank will deflate once out of a liquidity trap. However, this is exactly the opposite to 
what is optimal: in order to get out of the trap, the central bank needs to commit to 
generating higher than average inflation.  
Overall, this analysis shows that while in normal times, the alternative ways of 
implementing the optimal policy under commitment may be equivalent, there are 
important additional benefits of communicating the optimal policy in terms of a price 
level target. In particular, it makes the implementation of such a target in a situation 
where the zero lower interest rate constraint is binding much more credible, as agents 
will have experienced the actual implementation of a price level targeting regime. As 
highlighted above, a credible price level targeting rule is a particularly effective way 
of reducing the risk of falling in a deflationary trap when nominal interest rates are 
bound at zero. As highlighted by Berg and Jonung (1999), the Swedish experience 
with a price level target during the interwar period may be an example of how those 
benefits work in practice. 
  
2.3.  Going beyond the basic New Keynesian model 
Woodford (2003, page 501) has argued that the result of the optimality of price level 
stationarity in the basic New Keynesian model is relatively fragile given that the 
welfare does not depend at all on the range of variation in the absolute level of prices. 
However, the intuition that a monetary policy that does not let bygones be bygones 
has strong stabilising effects on inflation and economic activity, in particular in the 
                                                 
18   Similarly, Wolman (2005) shows in the basic New Keynesian model that a simple rule that targets the price 
level reduces the cost of the zero lower bound to almost zero even when the inflation target is zero. 
Reifschneider and Williams (1999) show that a price level targeting rule also works quite well in the US 
econometric model of the Federal Reserve Board.    20
presence of a potentially binding zero lower constraint on nominal interest rates is 
very strong and is likely to survive in more general characterisations of the economy 
as long as expectations matter. While full mean-reversion in the price level may not 
be a feature of the fully optimal policy in more general models, a price-level path 
targeting regime is a simple, easy-to-communicate way of implementing a policy that 
ensures an appropriate level of history dependence. Moreover, a flexible regime that 
allows for a gradual return of the price level to its target depending on the shocks 




Impulse response to a price-mark-up shock in the Smets-Wouters model 








































Notes: Low, medium and high correspond to different degrees of inflation indexation: 
0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 respectively. The impulse responses are derived under the assumption 
that the central bank minimises a loss function in the variability of the semi-difference 
of inflation, the output gap and interest rate changes under commitment. The 
respective weights are 0.9, 0.1 and 0.05. 
 
These findings can be illustrated using a much more elaborate model like Smets and 
Wouters (2003). This model incorporates a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve like 
the one analysed in Section 2.1., but also many other frictions such as nominal wage 
stickiness, habit formation and investment adjustment costs, which make it costly to 
revert the price level. Figure 3 shows the impulse response of the output gap, the   21
short-term interest rate, inflation, the price level and the nominal wage level to a one 
percent price-mark-up shock, when the central bank optimises under commitment an 
ad-hoc loss function in the semi-difference of inflation, the output gap and interest 
rate changes. It is immediately clear that in spite of the other real and nominal 
frictions the optimal commitment policy again induces a stationary price level. As in 
the simple New Keynesian model of Section 2.1, the higher the degree of inflation 
indexation, the more hump-shaped the price-level response and the longer it takes 
before prices revert back to baseline. Note that the medium case depicted in the 
Figure corresponds to the empirical estimate of the degree of indexation (i.e. 0.5). 
Reducing the weight on the variability of the output gap and interest rate changes 
shortens the horizon over which the price level is returned to baseline, confirming the 
analysis of Batini and Yates (2003) and Smets (2003). Those studies also show that 
the horizon over which mean reversion in the price level is to be achieved will depend 
on the structure of the economy. For example, if the Phillips curve of the economy is 
relatively flat, it is beneficial to have a relatively longer horizon. Figure 4 plots the 
impulse response functions to a price mark-up shock under different degrees of 
nominal wage rigidity. It is clear that also in this case higher nominal wage rigidity 
increases the time it takes for prices to return to baseline.  
 
Figure 4 
Impulse response to a price-mark-up shock under different degrees of nominal wage 
rigidity 
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Notes: Low, medium and high correspond to different degrees of nominal wage 
stickiness: 0.2, 0.7 and 0.9 respectively. See also the note to Figure 3. 
 
Finally, a similar reversal of the price level is also obtained in response to other 
shocks such as a wage mark-up shock as shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5 
Impulse response to a wage-mark-up shock in the Smets-Wouters model 








































Notes: Low, medium and high correspond to different degrees of inflation indexation: 
0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 respectively. See also the note to Figure 3.  
 
Taking into account the differences between the basic new Keynesian model and 
Smets and Wouters (2003) the similarity between the panels of Figure 3, depicting the 
output gap, inflation and the price level, and Figure 2 is remarkable. It suggests that 
the importance of endogenous expectations is still decisive in complex environments. 
The intuition remains that focusing on the price level allows the monetary authority to 
spread over time the effects of shocks that create a trade-off between low and stable 
inflation and the maintenance of output close to potential. Many authors have 
emphasised the importance of lagged inflation dependence for the cost-benefit 
analysis of price level path targeting. The results above suggest that the issue is not so   23
much whether to focus on price level path targeting but how long the mean reversion 
process should be allowed to take.  
Moreover, it is worth recalling that the automatic indexation of prices to past inflation 
that underlies the lagged inflation dependence in the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips 
curve discussed in Section 2.1. is not very much supported by the micro data. 
Typically, around 80% of observed prices in the consumer price index do not change 
in a given month. Finally, the degree of indexation is likely to be regime dependent. 
More specifically, it is likely that the degree of lagged inflation dependence would fall 
under a price level path targeting regime. 
Before turning to Section 3, it is also worth mentioning that a number of studies have 
analysed the properties of simple policy rules that include a price-level term in large-
scale macro-econometric models. One prominent example is Williams (2000), which 
uses the Federal Reserve’s FRBUS model and shows that a simple feedback rule on 





3.   Two objections to price level path stability. 
In this section, we discuss a number of counter arguments. We first discuss the 
argument that price level path stability is too costly when there is imperfect 
credibility. A related argument is that the transitional costs of moving to a price level 
path stability regime are too large in the presence of private sector learning. We then 
examine the argument that in the face of uncertainty and learning by the central bank, 
price level stability is too costly because it forces the central bank to instill volatility 
in the economy following its own mistakes.  
 
3.1.   Unrealistic reliance on credibility 
A number of papers have argued that the benefits of price level stability disappear or 
are greatly reduced when the degree of credibility of the monetary policy regime is 
limited or expectations are backward-looking rather than forward-looking.
20 For 
example, in early studies of simple policy rules in an economy with backward-looking 
expectations, Haldane and Salmon (1995) and Lebow, Roberts and Stockton (1992) 
                                                 
19   Another example is Black, Macklem and Rose (1998). See also section 3.1.   
20   This is also the main concern raised in Bank of Canada (2006).    24
find that feedback rules on the price level result in higher short-term variability for 
both inflation and output growth.
21 In a later simulation study, Black, Macklem and 
Rose (1997) shows that adding a price level gap term to the monetary policy reaction 
function can deliver significant reductions in the volatility of output, inflation and 
interest rates if there is a small effect of the price level gap on inflation expectations. 
MacLean and Pioro (2001) explicitly investigate to what extent the “free lunch” result 
of Svensson (1999) and others is robust to changes in assumptions about the way in 
which price expectations are formed and the “degree” of credibility. They model 
imperfect credibility as a process whereby private sector inflation expectations are a 
weighted average of forward-looking rational expectations, the inflation target and 
past inflation. They find that with model-consistent expectations, it is possible to 
reduce the variability in inflation, output and nominal interest rate. Moreover, 
incorporating credibility effects specifically tied to the price level target leads to even 
greater reductions in variability. At the same time, they confirm that when agents are 
highly backward-looking, introducing a price level target results in increased output 
and interest rate variability. Finally, using the policy model of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, also Williams (1999) finds that targeting the price 
level rather than the inflation rate generates little additional cost in terms of output 
and inflation variability. However, the characteristics of efficient policy rules depend 
critically on the assumption regarding expectations formation. In particular, the policy 
rule that is most efficient when the model assumes forward-looking expectations, turn 
out to be the worst when fixed adaptive expectations are assumed. The robustness of 
inflation and price level rules (or a combination of the two) is explicitly investigated 
in Jääskelä (2005). He shows that, if the policy maker overestimates the degree of 
forward-looking expectations, the optimal hybrid rule appears to be the worst 
performing rule. The standard Taylor rule that fails to introduce inertia avoids bad 
outcomes and is shown to be the most robust to model uncertainty.   
One criticism of the studies discussed above is that the expectation formation process 
is typically assumed to be fixed. In general, expectations formation will respond to the 
characteristics of the monetary policy regime. Even if expectations are backward-
looking, in the sense that they are based on regressions using past data as in the 
adaptive learning literature, the estimated regression model that agents use will 
change as the monetary policy regime is changed. In such a case, it is important to 
investigate whether the long-run benefits from moving to a regime of price level 
stability and accordingly anchored expectations outweigh the transitional costs as 
agents learn about the new regime and adjust their expectation formation process.  
                                                 
21   Another relevant study is Fillion and Tetlow (1994).   25
In the rest of this section, we perform this cost-benefit analysis in the context of the 
the basic New Keynesian model of Woodford (2003) discussed in Section 2.1. 
Following Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2007), we assume adaptive learning rather than 
rational expectations, i.e. agents form their expectations by running regressions on 
past inflation and prices. Equations (5) and (10) in Section 2.1 show that in both the 
discretionary and commitment equilibrium of the hybrid New Keynesian model, the 
price level can be written as a second-order autoregressive process. In the 
discretionary equilibrium there is a unit root in the price level, whereas in the 
commitment equilibrium prices are mean reverting. We therefore analyse the 
following experiment. Assume that agents start in a discretionary equilibrium. In this 
equilibrium the estimated coefficients on the price level process will be given by 
equation (5). Under the assumed calibration of Table 1, this implies that the first-order 
autoregressive coefficient is 1.5, whereas the second-order coefficient is -0.5. We then 
assume the central bank decides to implement the commitment equilibrium by 
following a rule like (9), which delivers price level stability. Two questions can now 
be answered. Will the equilibrium converge to the rational expectations equilibrium 
under commitment? If so, how long does it take and how important are the 
transitional costs? 
 
We rely on the fact that, under rational expectations, both in the case of commitment 
and discretion, the stochastic process for the price level can be written as an AR (2) 
process (see section 2.1.). Thus, under adaptive learning we assume that the agents 




Turning to the first question, the answer is affirmative. In order to answer the question 
Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2007) consider recursive least squares (RLS) learning and 
show, using the methods of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), that under the baseline 
calibration assumptions used above (and reasonable alternative assumptions) the 
associated dynamic system is indeed e-stable. In other words, one can prove that 
under recursive least squares learning the equilibrium will converge to the rational 
expectations equilibrium under commitment. This shows that even under adaptive 
learning (where the agents are completely backward looking), eventually the benefits 
of price level stability can be achieved in the long run. This result is illustrated in 
t t t t p p p ε α α + + = − − 2 2 1 1  26
Figure 6 using stochastic simulations for the calibrated model. Figure 6 displays 
mean-dynamics responses for our system. 
From equation (10), it is clear that, under RE and commitment, the autoregressive 
coefficients are 1.15 and -0.35 respectively. Under RLS Figure 6 shows the estimated 
coefficients converging slowly to these values. As a result, the price level becomes 
eventually stationary.  
Figure 6 is also informative regarding the second question raised above. It shows the 
convergence process of the estimated autoregressive parameters in the estimated price 
equation, as well as the mean loss incurred in the convergence process as a function of 
the initial gain. The initial gain will determine how fast agents learn the new regime. 
It can be considered as the weight agents put on past data relative to the data in the 
new regime. If the announcement of a price level stability regime is credible, agents 
will put little weight on the past experience and the convergence will be faster.    
 
Figure 6 
Convergence to the commitment regime:  
Losses and estimated autoregressive coefficients 






































Notes: The different convergence paths correspond to different initial estimation 
periods: T=10, 20, 30 and 40 quarters. 
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Figure 6 highlights that the speed of convergence will strongly depend on the speed of 
learning. When a relatively high weight is put on recent new observations the 
estimated coefficients converge quite rapidly. The upper left panel shows that because 
of learning there is an initial increase in the loss relative to the discretionary 
equilibrium (horizontal line at about 1.35), but after a few periods, as agents learn 
about the new regime, losses start falling and eventually fall below the discretionary 




Convergence with constant-gain learning 



































Notes: The different convergence paths correspond to different gains in the constant-
gain learning algorithm: gain=0.001, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03 and 0.04.  
 
Recursive least squares learning may not be the most attractive learning scheme when 
considering possible changes in policy regimes. Figure 7 plots a similar experiment in 
the case of constant gain learning where the constant gains considered vary from 0.01 
(slow learning) to 0.04 (fast learning). The size of these gains are consistent with 
empirical evidence on the speed of learning in the formation of inflation expectations 
(e.g. Orphanides and Williams, 2007). In this case there is no guarantee that the   28
learning equilibrium converges to the rational expectations commitment equilibrium. 
However, in each case the equilibrium loss converges to a loss level that is close to 
the one under commitment. 
Table 2 reports the time it takes for the losses to fall below the discretionary losses as 
well as the present discounted value of the difference in loss under price level stability 
and the discretionary policy, for different initial estimation periods, constant gains, 
degrees of indexation and degrees of price stickiness. It is worth noting that when 
learning is slow (as, for example, illustrated by the column with a constant gain of 
0.01 in Table 2), the transition process may take very long and on balance it may be 
too costly to move to a price level stability regime. However, this case is not likely to 
be empirically relevant for two reasons. First, empirical evidence on the speed of 
learning suggests that higher gains of 0.02 or above are more appropriate to describe 
the inflation expectations formation process. Under such gains the net benefits are 
positive. Second, communication by the central may facilitate the transition by 
speeding up the learning process. In the benchmark simulation with an initial 
estimation period of 5 years, it takes about 7 years before the losses fall under those of 
the discretionary equilibrium. Similar results are obtained with a constant gain of 
0.03. In both cases, the net benefit from moving to price level stability is positive with 
a discount factor of 0.99. This learning period can be shorted to 3-4 years if the initial 
estimation period is shorter or the speed of learning faster. A lower degree of 
indexation reduces the time it takes for the losses to be smaller than under the 
discretionary equilibrium, but the sensitivity is limited. In contrast, the duration and 
the net benefit seem to be more sensitive to changes in the degree of price stickiness. 
Increasing the degree of price stickiness to an average duration of one year lengthens 
the break-even period by more than a year. Clearly those calculations also depend on 
the assumed discount factor.
22 
Table 2 
 Initial  estimation  period  Constant gain  
 T=10  T=20  T=30  C=0.01  C=0.02 C=0.03  C=0.04 




























7 . 0 = γ   16 28 42  93 46 30  22 
                                                 
22   Preliminary results from Gaspar, Vestin and Smets (2007) show that convergence is faster under the price level 
rule compared to the history-dependence rule.    29
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Notes: The first entry gives the time in quarters it takes before the loss under the price 
level stability regime is lower than that under the discretionary regime. The second 
entry gives the discounted loss with a discount factor of 0.99. A negative number 
implies it is beneficial to implement a price level path stability regime. 
 
3.2.   Uncertainty and price level stability 
When the central bank faces uncertainty about the state and structure of the economy 
and the monetary transmission mechanism, it may make mistakes and may not be able 
to control the price level perfectly. One can argue that in such circumstances, price 
level stability would increase the cost of such central bank mistakes, as the central 
bank is forced to undo their effects on the price level. When prices are sticky, this will 
tend to increase the volatility of the real economy.   
Again, this argument is only partially true as it does not take into account the positive 
ex ante effects price level stability may have on expectation formation by the private 
sector in response to such central bank mistakes. Moreover, one should also take into 
account the positive effect of the commitment to price level stability on the central 
bank’s incentive not to make mistakes. 
Aoki and Nikolov (2005) evaluate the performance of three popular monetary policy 
rules when the central bank is learning about the parameter values of a simple New 
Keynesian model. In particular, both the central bank and the private sector learn 
about the slopes of the IS and Phillips curve by recursive least squares.
23 This model 
uncertainty also introduces uncertainty about the state of the economy, such as 
estimates of the natural real interest rate. The three policies are the optimal non-
inertial rule, the optimal history-dependent rule and the optimal price-level targeting 
rule. Under rational expectations the last two rules implement the fully optimal 
equilibrium by improving the output-inflation trade-off. The optimal history-
dependent rule is a targeting rule similar to the one exhibited in equation (6), whereas 
the optimal price level targeting rule relates the price level to the output gap.  
                                                 
23   The Phillips curve is similar to the one analysed before, but with no indexation. The IS curve is a forward-
looking IS curve as in Woodford (2003).   30
 
When imperfect information about the model parameters is introduced, Aoki and 
Nikolov (2005) find that the central bank makes monetary policy mistakes, which 
affect welfare to a different degree under the three rules. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
optimal history-dependent rule is worst affected and delivers the lowest welfare. It 
turns out that under this rule, endogenous persistence due to the rule works as a 
propagation mechanism of policy mistakes, in particular in response to demand 
shocks. In contrast, price level targeting performs best under learning and maintains 
the advantages of conducting policy under commitment. It turns out that adopting an 
integral representation of rules designed under full information is desirable because 
they deliver the beneficial output-inflation trade-off of commitment policy while 
being robust to implementation errors. Integral control elements improve the 
performance of feedback rules when, for example, there are errors in estimating the 
steady state of the system. In Aoki and Nikolov (2005), a rule involving integral term 
performs better because it reverses past policy mistakes. These benefits are even 
greater in a forward-looking model as they help stabilise inflation expectations.  
Importantly, Aoki and Nikolov (2005) show that those benefits of responding to a 
price level target continue to dominate when an interest rate variability term is 
introduced in the central bank’s objective function or inflation indexation is included 
in the Phillips curve. While under perfect information, mean reversion in the price 
level is no longer fully optimal, a rule implementing it is optimal when the central 
bank is learning about the model’s parameter values.  
Overall, the results in Aoki and Nikolov (2005) suggest that the benefits of price level 
targeting are enhanced rather than reduced when the central bank faces uncertainty 
about the structure of the economy. These results are confirmed by Orphanides and 
Williams (2007). They find that a first-difference rule, which is akin to a price level 
targeting rule, is a robust rule with respect to uncertainty about private sector learning 
and estimates of the natural interest rate and the natural rate of unemployment. 
Similarly, Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2005) argue that a price level target – which 
is a simple way to model a commitment to offset errors – can serve to anchor inflation 
even if the public believes the central bank is overly optimistic about shifts in 
potential output. The paper shows that price level targeting is superior to inflation 
targeting in a wide range of situations when potential output is uncertain. 
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4.  Conclusions 
We have provided a critical and selective survey of arguments that are relevant for 
assessing the case for price stability, i.e. the case for stability around a price level 
path. A regime of price level path stability is most compatible with the functioning of 
a market economy. Intuitively it provides a neutral numeraire allowing the market 
mechanism to operate fully. Therefore, it is not surprising that such regime was 
advocated, by classical economists like Knut Wicksell, Irving Fisher and John 
Maynard Keynes, as a superior alternative even relative to the Gold Standard.  
 
In the paper, we have identified two main arguments in favour of such a regime. First, 
under rational expectations price level stability helps overall macroeconomic stability 
by making expectations operate like automatic stabilizers. After a positive (negative) 
shock to the price level, firms, correctly anticipating a persistent policy response, 
adjust their inflation expectations down (up), thereby mitigating the impact of the 
shock. Moreover, focusing on the price level path contributes to circumventing 
credibility problems that central banks may face. Second, a commitment to a 
reversion to a price level path helps to alleviate the zero bound on nominal interest 
rates. Here the reason is that the changes in the price level help the inter-temporal 
adjustment. The mechanism described above implies that after a negative shock to the 
price level inflation expectations adjust upward, thereby depressing real interest rates, 
which in turn contributes to the stabilisation of the economy. Overall, the 
conventional wisdom that relies on a trade-off between low frequency uncertainty of 
the price level and high frequency volatility of inflation and the output gap disregards 
the fundamental importance of endogenous expectations for monetary policy making. 
In the paper we present arguments that make the case for price level stability 
dependent on the endogenous character of expectations. Such arguments are of 
general interest as they highlight the importance of endogenous expectations for the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
 
We have also investigated arguments made against price level path stability. A first 
argument against price level path stability is that it relies on the assumed credibility of 
the regime. Only with unrealistic levels of credibility would expectations operate like 
automatic stabilizers. Relying on our own recent research in models with adaptive 
learning, we present examples that this is not generally the case. We show that, under 
adaptive learning on the part of firms, the track record obtained under such a regime   32
leads to a similar case for price level path targeting. We also show that the question of 
regime transition and the associated costs is important but not decisive. A second 
argument is that price level stability would make past policy mistakes very costly to 
unwind. We refer to Aoki and Nikolov (2006) which shows that, in a model where 
both the central bank and the private sector are learning about the relevant parameters 
of the economy, price level targeting automatically corrects past policy mistakes. 
 
We have performed our analysis mostly within the framework of the hybrid New 
Keynesian Phillips curve, abstracting from other frictions such as nominal and real 
labour market rigidities. Such frictions will typically increase the costs associated 
with reverting the price level following a shock. However, they also increase the 
benefits of price level stability to the extent that the impact of inflation shocks on 
inflation is reduced. In particular, when agents and the central bank are learning and 
inflation shocks may persist and become costly to control, the benefits of price level 
stability may outweigh the costs. Moreover, those costs can be reduced by 
lengthening the horizon for price level stability accordingly.  Using the model of 
Smets and Wouters (2003), that incorporates a wide range of frictions, including 
nominal wage stickiness, habit formation and investment adjustment costs, we found 
that optimal policy under commitment delivers a stationary price level, as it does in 
the simple new Keynesian model. The results obtain using an ad-hoc loss function in 
the semi-difference of inflation, the output gap and interest rate changes 
    
Finally, it is frequently argued that a strategy based on price level stability would be 
hard to communicate and to explain to the public. In the paper we have argued that, 
on the contrary, a focus on the price level allows the central bank to follow a 
consistent communication strategy that circumvents the strains of commitment. It 
does seem to us that the public at large finds it much easier to focus on prices rather 
than on inflation. Working in first differences seems to be a common professional 
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